Objective: In England, two primary care incentive schemes were introduced to increase dementia diagnosis rates to two-thirds of expected levels. This study assesses the effectiveness of these schemes.
support services; empowering patients and their families to plan their lives better; prevention of avoidable health crises and further cognitive decline (when these are due to vascular risk factors) 5 ; and improvements in the delivery of care and in communication between providers, patients, and carers. 6 NHS England, the organisation that leads the National Health Service (NHS) in England, announced a £90M package to improve dementia diagnosis and care. 7 The raft of measures included two financial incentive schemes in primary care and one hospital scheme. The aim of these "tools and levers" was to increase diagnosis rates to the level of 67% of the expected number of people with the condition by
March 2015 (the so-called two-thirds ambition). 8 Whilst some interventions were designed to improve dementia care directly, financial incentives have been shown to be powerful levers in effecting behavioural changes in primary and secondary care. 9, 10 The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of these financial incentives on diagnostic rates of dementia in primary care.
| Incentive schemes
The two primary care schemes for tackling underdiagnosis were the Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18) and the Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS). The schemes were facilitated by a separate payfor-performance scheme, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Since 2006, the QOF has incentivised good quality care for people with dementia, primarily via a face-to-face annual review [11] [12] [13] and requires practices to maintain a dementia register. We measured the schemes' effectiveness in tackling underdiagnosis by the gap between the "reported" (recorded) and "expected" numbers on practices' QOF dementia registers.
14 DES18 ran from April 2013 to March 2016. 15 The scheme encouraged a proactive approach to timely assessment of individuals at risk of dementia, followed-up by advanced care planning for newly diagnosed patients and a health check for carers. Participating practices received an upfront payment and an annual end-of-year payment based on the proportion of national assessments the practice undertook. These payments were funded centrally by annual budgets of £21M for each of the 2 payments, making a total budget of £126M over the 3 years DES18 operated.
DIS operated for 6 months from September 30, 2014, to March 31, 2015, and was intended to support and complement DES18. Funding available for this scheme totalled £5M. 17 A third scheme that incentivised hospitals (FAIR) ran in parallel with the primary care schemes, and we controlled for this in our analyses.
2 | METHODS
| Data
Details of the datasets analysed are in Appendix S1, and summary statistics for the outcome and control variables in our model are in Table 1 .
| Study sample
To be included in our study, practices had to have a QOF dementia reg- this includes practices that closed, opened, split, or merged during the study period. Second, we tested the implications of assuming that the effect of DES18 persisted after a practice had exited the scheme.
| Dependent variable
For two practices with identical dementia registers but with very different expected registers, the risk of an "event" (adding a patient to the dementia register) can vary considerably because practices with larger expected registers have greater capacity to improve. We defined our dependent variable as the percentage of expected cases of dementia that was recorded on the dementia register (the "rate").
The numerator was the number of people recorded on the GP practice's dementia register. The denominator was the expected number of patients aged 65 and over with dementia, which was based on the number, age, and sex of a practice's registered patients living in a nursing home and on the number, age, and sex of the remaining practice patients. We distinguished nursing home patients from community-dwelling patients because the prevalence of dementia differs between the two groups. 18 The General and Personal Medical Services dataset publishes annual data on the number, age, and sex of a practice's registered patients. NHS Digital publishes annual data on the number of nursing home patients in a practice but not by age and sex. We therefore estimated the number of nursing home patients in each age/sex band using values for the national care home population taken from the 2011 Census. Appendix S1 (found in the Supporting Information) details the data sources used for these calculations.
Key points
• Receiving a timely formal diagnosis of dementia can allow patients and their carers to access appropriate care and support packages, prevent avoidable health crises, and plan ahead more effectively.
• The combined effect of two incentive schemes was to increase GP dementia registers nationally by around 40 000 cases; this figure would have been almost 50 000 if all practices had taken part.
• The schemes had the intended impact on dementia care, suggesting that financial incentives can enhance performance in primary care and may be useful for other disease areas where underdiagnosis is problematic.
| Defining participation
Our key explanatory variables were practice participation in the two schemes. We used the following rules to define participation.
Practices were deemed to have participated in DES18 in a particular year in the period 2013-2014 to 2015-2016 if they reported data on the number of dementia assessments undertaken that year, even if that number was zero. Practices not reporting assessment data were deemed to be non-participants.
Practices participating in DIS were required to report monthly data on recorded dementia diagnoses for September 2014 and for at least one month from October 2014 to March 2015. 16 However, some practices that submitted monthly data did not take part in DIS.
NHS England provided us with a DIS participant list based on information collected by Local Area Teams for payment purposes.
| Covariates
One of the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) national targets, 19 the hospital incentive scheme FAIR was also designed to increase diagnostic rates for dementia. To adjust for regional effects, we included variables for each practice's Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) using NHS England's list of active practices. CCGs for practices that had closed were identified by linking a National Audit Office mapping file to the Office for National Statistics' Postcode Directory.
| Statistical modelling
Our unit of analysis was the GP practice. We modelled the two practice schemes, DES18 and DIS, as binary participation indicators and evaluated their impact on the rate as defined above. Our econometric design needed to accommodate multiple incentive schemes as well as the different times the schemes were introduced and taken up.
We identified different types of participants for the 3-year DES18
scheme and for the 6-month DIS scheme, distinguishing practices into categories according to the number and order of years of participation (Table 2) . For example, a practice that only participated in the first two years of DES18 (but not the third year) was categorised as "Y/Y/N."
Our methodological framework was a "difference-in-differences"
(DID) design. 21 We compared the difference in rates before and after the introduction of the schemes by participation type using linear mixed effects models. These models assume that, in the absence of the intervention, outcome differences between participants and non-participants are constant over time. Therefore, any differences in rates observed in the postintervention period over and above the time trend can be attributed to the incentive scheme. This effect is measured by the coefficient on the policy variable. We applied a DID model with multiple periods [22] [23] [24] (technical details are in Appendix S2).
The postestimation "predict" function was used to derive predicted rates under hypothetical participation scenarios, enabling us to estimate the national impact on dementia registers. Analyses were undertaken in Stata v14.2. 
| Regression analysis
Whilst the unadjusted data suggested that practices participating in the schemes closed the gap between their recorded and expected registers at a faster rate than non-participants, the DID analysis tested whether the observed differences were explained by confounding factors. The estimates for the DES18 participation groups showed no difference between the rates of practices that never participated in DES18 and the other practice groups in the preintervention period, with the exception of practices that participated only in the final year Appendix S2). Similarly, the rates for DIS participants did not differ significantly from those of non-participants in the preintervention period.
The policy variables (delta coefficients; Appendix S2) for DES18
were positive and significant. The DES18 scheme increased the rate for the intervention practices by 1.44 percentage points more than the increase in the rate for non-participating practices. DES18 had a significant effect in reducing the gap between recorded and expected registers (P < .001). The effect of DIS was larger with an estimated 3.59 percentage points increase in the rate (P < .001).
The effect of the hospital scheme (FAIR) was not statistically significant. Higher overall achievement on the QOF clinical domain presumably reflected better overall practice quality that helped close the gap between the recorded and expected prevalence of dementia.
Practices with larger proportions of patients living in urban areas and practices with more disadvantaged patients had smaller gaps between recorded and expected dementia registers (ie, higher rates). Practices with a higher proportion of individuals aged 65 and above had significantly lower rates (P < .001), as did practices with a General Medical Services contract (P < .05).
To quantify the added value of the schemes, we predicted the rates under hypothetical participation scenarios. The first scenario is the mean predicted rate assuming practices participated fully in both DES18 and DIS (as they did in this subsample). The last three scenarios are hypothetical (predicted) counterfactuals; for instance, the fourth scenario predicts the rates that would have been observed had these practices not participated in either scheme.
Had all practices in the unbalanced panel participated fully in both schemes, these predicted values suggest that national dementia registers would have increased by 48 685. As participation levels were suboptimal, the net effect of the schemes was to increase registers by 40 767 (59% of which was attributable to DES18).
| Sensitivity analysis
The results were robust to two sensitivity analyses (results are shown register over a 6-month period, had an even larger impact, delivering an average net increase in registers of 2.98.
In common with most evaluations of pay-for-performance schemes, this study faced several methodological challenges, 9 10 which we discuss below.
Ideally, participation in the schemes would have been randomly allocated to minimise the risk of known and unknown biases affecting results. However, DID analysis is a good alternative when randomisation is not possible because policies have been rolled out nationally. Difference-in-differences assumes the intervention groups have a common trend with the control group, and the regression analysis (participation coefficients) supports that assumption. We controlled for practice characteristics we believed could affect diagnosis rates but cannot rule out the possibility that other factors we could not measure, such as the availability of memory clinics, may have influenced results.
A key challenge in this study was defining participation in the schemes. Some practices could be clearly identified as participants or non-participants, but others were "grey" practices that signed up to the DES18 scheme but then, apparently, did nothing-or so the assessments data suggest. Are these practices "failed" participants (as we assumed) or non-participants? This matters because our models presuppose a clear distinction between the intervention and control groups. For DIS, NHS England provided a list of participants. The list was based on data provided by their Local Area Teams for payment purposes and was subject to numerous checks.
Our study relied on administrative datasets that are subject to the usual challenges in relation to coding errors and missing data. Data on FAIR were only available for 2 of the 3 indicators in 2015/2016, so our measure only partially captures hospitals' efforts in diagnosing dementia patients. For approximately 15% of practices that had fewer than 6 patients in nursing homes, data were suppressed to prevent disclosure. We imputed these missing data with random values between 1 and 5.* In addition, the age/sex distribution of nursing home patients in practices is unknown, so we imputed national distributions (Appendix S1).
We do not know of any previous studies quantifying the impact of schemes to boost diagnosis rates of dementia. However, the targeting of financial incentives on GPs in order to achieve quality improvements underpins the major policy initiative of the QOF programme. Research on the QOF suggests that overall, this policy has been successful in promoting quality improvements-although at relatively modest levels which tend to reduce over time-in the incentivised conditions. 12, 13, 25, 26 In our study, both DES18 and the DIS schemes appeared effective. The impact of DIS is unsurprising given the direct and time-limited nature of the incentive, which was designed to focus attention on the issue of underdiagnosis of dementia. There were calls from doctors for DIS to be withdrawn, 27 criticising it as "cash for diagnosis" 28 and "unethical and dangerous for patients," 29 nonetheless, over three-quarters of practices opted in. We also found evidence suggesting the effects of both schemes persisted after practices had exited the schemes, which supports findings from an evaluation of the withdrawal of QOF indicators. 30 The hospital CQUIN scheme, FAIR, appears not to have had the expected trickledown effect on GP registers. Previous research has found little evidence of any effect of CQUIN schemes aside from those involving hip fracture. 31 NHS England achieved its two-thirds ambition for dementia in November 2015. 5 During the years when the schemes were active, total numbers on the dementia registers increased by 123 266. However, only one-third (40 767) of these additional cases are attributable to the 2 schemes. The schemes' effect on the number of newly diagnosed individuals will be higher than this figure, because some additions to the register replace individuals who have died.
Total expenditure on the schemes has not been published, but we estimate the budget to be around £131M, comprising £5M for DIS 17 and £42M available in each of the 3 years for DES18. 32 Despite the controversy over DIS, our results illustrate that direct, targeted, and time-limited financial incentives for GPs work, and as a result, quality of care has likely been enhanced for those individuals whose dementia was identified through the schemes. We also found evidence suggesting that the impact of the schemes persists after they ended, although our evaluation had limited follow-up. Policymakers may consider repeating this approach either for dementia or for other disease areas where early diagnosis is considered beneficial.
Remaining gaps in the evidence base include the wider benefits and unintended consequences of the schemes and the true cost of delivering the schemes, as opposed to the budgeted expenditure.
Although our study demonstrated the schemes were successful in closing the diagnosis gap, a comprehensive assessment of the costeffectiveness of using financial incentives to improve diagnosis rates would require further research in these two key areas.
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